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Response
Philip O. Geier
Philip Bobbitt’s brilliant scholarship is most apparent when he thinks
big, linking strategy and law over great expanses of time. His essay
presented here suggests this and his magnum opus The Shield of
Achilles impressively depicts an historical pattern over the course of
500 years whereby decades-long epochal wars are followed by treaties
that stabilize and redefine the political and constitutional contours of
the world. This pattern, we learn, has repeatedly changed the nature of
organized societies, with the state taking differing forms over time.1
Bobbitt sees this pattern recurring in the 20th century through what
he calls the “Long War,” beginning in 1915 and concluding in 1990
with the Charter of Paris. At the end of this so-called epochal war, the
“nation-state” gives way to the “market state.” Bobbitt indeed gives us
much to ponder.
For whatever reasons, and certainly September 11 is among them, a
new stability and legitimacy that might be expected from Bobbitt’s his-
torical model did not emerge on the heels of the Long War, and, all too
quickly, we seem to be on the brink of another epochal war.
Our present horrific realities, Bobbitt explains, have arisen from the
simultaneous development of three things: the commodification of
weapons of mass destruction; the emergence of a global terrorist net-
work; and the greater vulnerability due to technical advances that
have brought nations into closer proximity, blurring traditional geo-
graphic boundaries. Bobbitt chronicles the threatening nature of our
contemporary lives with a disturbing reminder of the widespread ter-
rorism that has taken place over the past two years, beginning with
September 11. The breadth and pace of this terrorism, what Bobbitt
calls “the drumbeat of violence,” seems to be gaining momentum and
irreversibly so.
Bobbitt helps us grapple with this bleak reality by raising basic
questions about “winning” the war on terrorism. Here he offers his
most provocative insights and demonstrates the scope of his fertile
mind. What, he asks, might define success in such a war? How, he
wonders, might we reconcile the rights of individuals with the powers
of government? This relates directly to his convincing point that
today’s world has broken down the previous inviolability of national
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sovereignty. What are the legal and strategic parameters for fighting
terrorism?
He concludes that, “our current ways of understanding terrorism
render the problems practically insoluble.” We need, it seems, to
decide whether to redefine the problem or just find better solutions to
the problem as already defined.
*****
Only such an accomplished thinker and scholar as Bobbitt would dare
to end his 900-page magnum opus with this final sentence: “I invite
amendment.” One reviewer of this extraordinary work commented
that, “it inspires reflection even where it provokes disagreement.” In
that spirit, my own reflection on Bobbitt’s thinking prompts me to
offer a few variations on his contentions.
First, the 500-year cyclical pattern which he portrays — ever since
1500 there have been a series of five epochal wars at the end of which a
new framework is legitimized by a treaty — seems less convincing
about the 20th century, which he sees dominated by one Long War.
Bobbitt chooses to combine the First World War, the Second World
War, and the Cold War all into one Long War. Others of us would
view at least the Cold War differently. The Cold War was not so much
a fifty-year extension of war but instead, as former British Ambassador
to the U.S. Peter Jay explains it, “an armed peacetime competition
between Washington and Moscow for spheres of influence, always
short of upsetting the equilibrium, however unstable, that preserved
the nuclear stalemate and so the peace.”2
Second, one might also contest whether the Charter of Paris in 1990
was a significant treaty that legitimized anything. As Bobbitt himself
amply illustrates, the post-Cold War era did not establish any new sta-
bilizing framework. The immediate aftermath of the Cold War led not
to a new world order, as the first President Bush labeled it at the time,
but instead to a new world disorder.
Third, one might take exception to Bobbitt’s generalization that,
“most states have lived for most of the 20th century” by a constitu-
tional order that he labels the nation-state. This is simply to say that
Bobbitt’s focus over the 500 years (as well as in contemporary terms)
has a distinctly Eurocentric orientation and largely overlooks the rest
of the world.
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Fourth, one might take a closer look at Bobbitt’s generalization that
the nation-state is mutating into a market state in the wake of the Long
War. Certainly developments such as boundary-free technology and
communications as well as transnational corporations have inadver-
tently or purposefully weakened or threatened the traditional roles
and boundaries of countries. But these have been evolutionary and
were evident well before the end of Bobbitt’s Long War. I would argue
that they not only existed during the Cold War but that they con-
tributed mightily to its end. Hence, the mutation of the nation-state
into a market state, at least in the U.S., was neither new nor a product
of the end of the putative Long War. The American experience offers
abundant evidence of “market state” inclinations throughout its his-
tory.
Beginning with the Constitution, which, among other things, legit-
imized “the pursuit of happiness,” the American experience has con-
trasted starkly with the European experience (not to mention
elsewhere in the world) in terms of how much the nation-state should
provide for the welfare of its citizens. The market state maximizes its
citizens’ opportunities rather than providing for their welfare. The
evolution of the market state has clearly accelerated over the past 25
years in terms of limiting the role of government as well as fomenting
the emerging political preferences for the private sector over the pub-
lic. It is ironic to note, however, that the current Bush administration,
contrary to its political philosophy, has expanded rather than con-
tracted the role of government and increased its public workforce by
over one million people since 2000. In contrast to the American experi-
ence, the market state’s more recent appearance and proliferation else-
where in the post-Cold War world reflects a dramatic and
controversial shift. One might even ascribe part of the current antipa-
thy for the U.S. felt by the so-called “Old Europe” to this market state
development.
In spite of the emergence of the market state, it is far too early to
write off the nation-state. I believe that we will increasingly witness a
tug-of-war between the roles of the public and private sectors in devel-
oped societies as long as the democratic model that emerged victorious
from the Cold War remains dominant. Further, the flames of tradi-
tional nationalism have been fanned anew by terrorism and the war on
terrorism to the detriment of supranational inclinations.
Fifth, one might argue that Bobbitt goes too far in characterizing Al-
Qaida as a “virtual state,” with such things as a standing army, trea-
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sury, permanent civil service, and even a rudimentary welfare pro-
gram for its fighters and families. The only thing Al-Qaida is missing
in terms of being a traditional state, it seems, is contiguous territory.
Perhaps a better characterization than “virtual state” would be to
describe Al-Qaida as a multinational network of mercenary terrorists.
This distinction is not just quibbling over terminology because it sug-
gests a substantial difference in how to address the problem of Al-
Qaida in particular and terrorism in general. Did September 11 really
change everything, as the Bush administration believes? Are we now
engaged in another epochal war, as Bobbitt posits? Are established
international institutions really no longer relevant or useful?
*****
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. emerged as the uncontested leader as well as the most powerful
nation in the world. As we reflect on the present plight of the world,
we would do well to consider the evolution over the past few years of
America’s singular status.
I suggest that America’s unique preeminence is based on two signif-
icant traits: on the one hand, America is built on a set of values (free-
dom, individual rights, democracy) and unmatched material success
(opportunity, the pursuit of happiness); on the other, America is built
on unrivaled power in both military and economic terms. It is (or has
been) the envy of the world due to this potent combination. This
implies that America’s chances of sustaining its leadership in the
world hinge on its ability to keep this combination in balance. By this
line of reasoning, the U.S. must continue to demonstrate to others the
centrality of its values, the vitality of its economic system, and the
superiority of its military. To let go of any one of these components
could threaten America’s leadership role in the 21st century. That is
why we must ask whether the way the U.S. is conducting the war on
terrorism is serving to enhance or diminish its leadership in the world?
Bobbitt rightly worries about the U.S. losing “its strategic hegemony
and its legal legitimacy as the foremost leader of the West” as well as
the West losing “its strategic hegemony as an alliance and its legiti-
macy as the chief formulator and adherent to the rule of law for the
international community.” How does one maintain such a legitimate
role as the foremost leader? How does one best maintain such a signif-
icant alliance? Since the U.S. has now asserted itself independently of
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most of the international community, what has happened to its per-
ceived value as the world’s leader, as opposed to only the world’s
most powerful nation? While leadership and power can be mutually
reinforcing, it may be that the U.S. is sacrificing its leadership by
asserting its power while failing to demonstrate its values and retain
the respect of its traditional allies.
It is clear that well before September 11 the new Bush administra-
tion had decided on a policy to reject a variety of international institu-
tions and agreements. These included repudiation of the Kyoto
Protocol on the environment, withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, dis-
missal of the protocol on the Biological Weapons Convention, and dec-
laration as null and void former President Clinton’s signature on the
International Criminal Court Treaty (though it was a moot issue as it
had never been ratified by Congress). One could argue the relative
merits of each of these, but the indisputable cumulative impact has
been a go-it-alone, even defiant, posture by the U.S. vis-à-vis the rest of
the world.3
Even so, September 11 presented an unprecedented opportunity for
the U.S. to galvanize the world in opposition to the common threat of
terrorism. As diverse a group as Iran and the Palestinian Authority,
Pakistan, China, and Russia (among many others) all condemned the
attacks and pledged support. For the first time in its history, NATO
declared the crimes of September 11 to be acts of aggression against
the entire alliance. Out of crisis and tragedy emerged a moment of
tremendous opportunity.
That moment of opportunity was lost. It slipped away as the Bush
administration sacrificed broad-based coalition building in favor of
deciding and acting only on its own terms. This began explicitly with
President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address to Congress,
which turned the focus of the war on terrorism to the “Axis of Evil”
countries, particularly Iraq. It continued with the publication of the
National Security Strategy in September 2002, which transformed
“anticipatory self-defense — a tool every president has quietly held in
reserve — into the centerpiece of its national security policy.” Former
Secretary of State Madeline Albright criticizes the Bush administration
for abandoning a policy of “reliance on alliance” and adopting instead
a policy of “redemption through preemption.” In the eyes of many
around the world, this new doctrine of preemption suddenly consti-
tuted an American threat to international order.4
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By 2003, America’s war on terrorism had become largely a war on
the “rogue state” of Iraq, lumping Saddam Hussein with Al-Qaida.
Whatever merits there were to invading Iraq, the combination of the
decision to do so and the way the decision was made effectively
destroyed the opportunity resulting from September 11 for the U.S. to
mobilize a unified multinational coalition against terrorism.
Instead of pursuing a coalition war on terrorism focused on Al-
Qaida, the Bush administration chose a much higher risk strategy with
the expectation of much higher returns. It chose to invade Iraq to trans-
form the entire Middle Eastern region and to reorient American power
in that region—for strategic, security, and economic reasons.5
The war in Iraq redefined the war on terrorism. As of this writing, it
remains to be seen whether Bush’s essentially unilateral action will
achieve its strategic objectives. But what about the war on terrorism
elsewhere? Results seem to be mixed at best. Focus on Al-Qaida has
been blurred, any hope of a broad-based alliance has evaporated, the
United Nations has been marginalized, and world opinion has turned
against rather than for the U.S. How do these conditions relate to the
original objective of combating terrorism? As the U.S. has flexed its
military muscles in Iraq, are the U.S. and the world less or more threat-
ened by terrorism?
Bobbitt’s fascinating thesis about the role of the state implicitly
raises another central question about how the U.S. has conducted its
war on terrorism. Bobbitt asks “basic questions about winning the war
on terrorism in terms of strategies and tactics.” By invading Iraq, the
U.S. has chosen to fight a traditional conflict of invasion and occupa-
tion of a state. By so doing, the U.S. may have undercut its own capa-
bilities and resources, not to mention the loss of possible allies, in
waging a nimble, multifaceted, and nontraditional war on terrorists.
*****
What conclusions might we draw from this discussion? If our topic is
the war on terrorism, how best should it be fought? If our topic is the
changing character of the state in this era, how best should these
changing states interact?
From my perspective, the basic issue is that of multilateralism ver-
sus unilateralism. My argument has been that the U.S. lost a rare
opportunity immediately after September 11 to affirm its leadership
and galvanize the world in a collective and persistent response.
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Instead of affirming its leadership, however, it simply asserted its
power.
Even the National Security Strategy paper had advised: “no nation
can build a safer, better world alone.” Regrettably, the U.S. did not
heed these words to any large extent.
One can conclude that unilateralism is impractical. It has also
served to be isolating. It could be that it becomes self-defeating. World
perceptions now view the U.S. as an international threat. This is quite a
radical shift from the outpourings of sympathy and unity of purpose
that appeared on the heels of September 11.
What if the U.S. acknowledged the isolating impracticality of unilat-
eralism and desired to re-engage in some meaningful multilateral fash-
ion? What new doctrines might shape a viable “new world order” that
would be relevant to the changed global circumstances as well as be
sustainable as we move ahead?
I believe that we are in an era of renewed nationalism, not—as some
hope and others fear — that we are in era of globalized post-national-
ism. That is to say that nation-states are not dissolving into market
states in spite of numerous transcendent, supranational phenomena.
Accordingly, we would be well served to reexamine the traditional
context of international relations rather than thinking that this tradi-
tional framework is passé. In this regard, I suggest that we reconsider
the potential of the United Nations, in spite of its obvious structural
flaws and need for further reform.
Reformulating the U.N. would be a far better exercise than margin-
alizing it further. Could the U.N. be given a rejuvenated mandate?
Could the U.S. work with others to develop a new international doc-
trine that is able to replace the U.N.’s anachronistic role of protecting
state sovereignty? Might this new role be to protect a combination of
national security and international human rights?6
Some major reform of the U.N. along these lines would, in my
American way of looking at things, also allow for the reappearance of
legitimate American leadership on the global scene.
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